Introduction

The Philippine islands and its climate vulnerability profile
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7 107 islands, with a population of around 92 million (NCSB 2010) . With a total area of approximately 300,000 square kilometers (sq. km.), the Philippines is located in Southeast Asia, close to the equator and on the Pacific Ring of Fire (PSA [2014] ). Its mean annual temperature values range from 19.5 degrees Celsius in mountain areas up to 28.2 degrees Celsius in small islands (Amadore 2005) . The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Ser- 1951 -1980 and 1960 -1990 (PAGASA [2014 ). The studies of PAGASA [2014] and Amadore (2005) both found no significant trends in rainfall indices, but noted increasing frequency and increasing rainfall amounts, respectively.
These have manifested in several tropical cyclones that have been categorized as "extreme climate events," which is qualitatively characterized as, " [having] one thing in common -persistent torrential rains, causing landslides and flash floods, killing 1 The study is based on the Potential Destructiveness Index (PDI) of tropical cyclones from 1949 to 2003. people and destroying properties and the environment along its path" (Jabines & Inventor 2007) . These characterize several typhoons that hit the Philippines during the period of 2000-2013. These also constitute the "exposure" component in the definition of vulnerability, which has been summed up by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001) as a function of exposure (the degree of climate stress), sensitivity (the degree to which a system responds to a given change in climate, whether beneficial or harmful effects), and adaptive capacity (the degree to which a system can adjust its practices, processes, or structures and consequently moderate or offset the potential for damage or take advantage of opportunities created by the situation).
Several studies have assessed the Philippines to have a high vulnerability to climate change due to its high exposure and apparent low adaptive capacity. Jabines and Inventor (2007) point to the "geographical features, low level of economic development and exposure exacerbated by poor access to resources" as factors contributing to high vulnerability. The United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) ranked the Philippines as third in terms of high disaster risk in its WorldRiskReport 2011. They have attributed the rankings to "extremely high exposure" (UNU-EHS 2011). The Philippines has also been constantly included in Germanwatch's Global Climate Risk Index, which analyses the quantified impacts of extreme weather events through number of fatalities and amount of economic losses (Kreft & Epstein 2013) .
The Philippines, an "islands" nation, is clearly a climate hotspot. Several devastating typhoons that have ravaged the country in the past decade has not only claimed lives nor damaged the economy but has also stunted the development of the affected regions. While cross-border migration has long been a phenomenon in the Philippines due to economic reasons, it is now not far off that people will move due to environment as one compelling reason. The temporary migration that occurred during typhoon Haiyan in 2013 is a glimpse of this. The following subsection details the economic cross-border migration phenomenon in the Philippines. The sections thereafter discuss the role that this phenomenon has played during major typhoon events such as typhoon Haiyan and how this reinforces migration while also reinforcing cosmopolitan practices not only among Filipinos but other nationalities as well.
Cross-border economic migration phenomenon in the Philippines
Since the 1970s, the Philippine state has taken up a national modernization project that relies on the incorporation of cheap export labour and the regulation of overseas Filipino workers' (OFWs') remittances. In fact, a Labour Export Policy was adopted as a stop-gap solution, the primary purpose of which was to offer an alternative to the domestic labour market as a way to tackle a high unemployment rate (Cai 2011) .
The overseas employment strategy is believed to have brought about positive outcomes in terms of economic stability in the country, thus the policy still stands today (ibid). Correspondingly, the ratification of Republic Act (RA) 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 2 , officially made labour migration no longer a fleeting phenomenon in the country. It is an "act to institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes" (p.1). The act significantly redefined the relationship between the state and its citizens living overseas (Rodriguez 2002) . The role of the state then has become that of a manager of overseas employment. As the report from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) stated, "Many people see opportunities abroad and want to benefit from them. And there are labor-market gaps in the global economy that are best filled by labor migration. The challenge to Philippine policymaking today is not one of exporting the country's labor surplus; it is managing effectively the natural process of labor migration-which will continue even if we ban the outflow of our workers." (DOLE 1995 in Guevarra 2003 2 A significant event prompted this passage. In 1995, Flor Contemplacion, a Singapore-based domestic worker, was executed by the Singaporean administration for allegedly killing another Filipina domestic worker and the child in her custody. Contemplacion's hanging infuriated Filipinos everywhere who believed that the Philippine government could have intervened on behalf of Contemplacion because she was a Filipino citizen and a migrant worker who is one of the country's so-called 'new national heroes.' Following some mass protests, Philippine lawmakers were impelled to critically address the forms of rights and protections the state should extend to its citizens overseas (Rodriguez 2002) .
The state oddly maintains that opportunities abroad are inherent processes of globalization and that the yearnings and ambitions of Filipinos to work overseas are instinctive responses (Guevarra 2003) . The Philippine state has "institutionalized" transnational labour migration through which the country would gain from, thereby turning labour migrant population of an average of 10 million across the globe into a vehicle of economic growth (Camroux, 2008) . Interestingly, RA 8042 also claims that overseas labor deployment is not "an official development strategy" of the Filipino government. Former DOLE Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas once said, "Overseas employment is a choice made by individuals. We don't push them. But once they leave for overseas, the government is duty bound to assure that their contracts have ample provisions for their protection" (Pring & Roco 2012) .
The Philippine state has undertaken a large scale labour export regime that has giv- Moreover, the Philippines has earned international recognition as a global model country for labour-exporting countries (Center for Migrant Advocacy and FriedrichEbert-Stiftung 2009). The mechanism of migrant processing and protection system comprises of three major components: (1) the POEA which regulates recruitment and administer pre-departure orientation; (2) labour attachés positioned at consulates overseas providing on-site assistance to migrants, and feeding POEA with information about any labour market expansion or newly-opened labour markets to that the Philippines may deploy manpower to (Guevarra 2003) ; and (3) the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) which serves as welfare centres for OFWs, covering the cost of emergency repatriation, and offering various services to families of OFWs. These governmental activities are financed by fees collected from migrants: a 100 PHP (approx. 1.60 EUR) clearance fee from the National Bureau of Investigation and a 3 000 PHP (approx. 50 EUR) processing fee charged by the POEA. Moreover, OFWs pay the recruitment agencies which connect them to overseas jobs-officially not more than one month's wages abroad (Pring & Roco 2012) .
Hence, although the Philippine state may not overtly confess that it promotes overseas employment, the very presence of this mechanism constructs and perpetuates the "culture of transnational labour migration" in the country.
Transnational labour migration is an effectual opportunity through which the country stabilizes its citizens to secure household maintenance and/or investments. These OFWs, hereafter referred to as cross-border migrants, constitute an international network of Filipinos who are instrumental not only in keeping the Philippine economy afloat but also in constituting a network that may serve as a response to major environmental disasters in the Philippines. The Philippine government has officially pegged the death toll at around 6 000 people; however, empirical interviews with survivors and locals have turned up estimates as high as 20 000 to 50 000 people. Typhoons bring immense damage to the Philippines and major humanitarian assistance is usually extended by both national citizens within and outside the country and the international community. The next section investigates the key issues in which the proposed topic emerged: states' policy responses and their views on migration as an option to adapting to environmental disaster and factual relationship between changing environmental realities and migration.
Typhoon Haiyan and major environmental disasters in the Philip
Emerging transnational systemic responses to major environmental disasters
On the basis of existing empirical discoveries, two major interrelated arguments develop: the first points to socio-economic cross-border migration which can support the demands of environmental changes at the onset; and, second, that the dialogue and relationship between the phenomena of environmental change and migration can be approached through analyzing transnational migrant networks in the context of cosmopolitanism. These two points are deeply entangled as these types of mi- However, the availability period of the relief is not disclosed.
One of the options accessible is request for a change or an extension of non- Some requirements need to be fulfilled: a step-parent or child will only qualify if the marriage creating the step parent/child relationship occurred before the child's 18th birthday; and, a USC filing a petition on behalf of a parent must be 21 years old. Oth- The case of U.S. and Canada provides an exemplary case of humanitarian postdisaster interventions through loosening tight immigration and admission state policies. They represent how states could or should treat those people affected by a humanitarian crisis and of the protection they should receive. These particular states view migration not only as a reactive strategy but also a proactive one. Instead of regarding migration as a last-resort option, these states advance migration strategy as a coping mechanism and a way of adapting to climate-related natural hazard.
Transnational activism
By transnational activism, we refer to active citizens who use their rights to enhance the quality of political or civic life through collective action with the aim of giving voices to marginalized sectors of the society. We invoke the term "transnational" to refer to the scale as to which rights, duties and social practices cut across national bor- "I felt that the situation was a dire humanitarian crisis that put the government's capabilities and resources to the test that required private persons so used to complaining about the Philippine government to put their money where their mouth was. While delayed disaster response is flatly unsurprising for a developing country, I was leaning towards the position that despite any preparations made, any other country would be overwhelmed by the unprecedented destruction wrought by Yolanda and the logistical and humanitarian nightmare that followed. I would have to say that I was interpolated into the act of helping more as a result of my friend's request and personal empathy rather than a nationalistic act. I have taken part in a number of charity drives not related to the Philippines, and I cannot say that I had more or fewer emotions than I had while doing the donation drive for the Yolanda victims, possibly because people I per-sonally know had not been affected, or because I cannot fully say that the Filipino people are more valuable to me than other areas of the world or urgent catastrophes. I did not feel that our actions could save anybody's life -that would be too presumptuous, but I hoped that we could at least feed a few families in their time of need."
Comparatively, a half-Filipino half-Bosnian 13-year old student in Bielefeld, Princess, responded emphatically to the devastating news through asking her whole family to be involved in a fund-raising project. Over breakfast, they organized an event where people, mostly their friends and network, could donate food or sell some items to raise funds. They gathered 4 300 EUR and Princess, together with her grandmother, 
Conceptual Issues
From a research standpoint, we do not propose for a causal understanding on the relationship between climate change and migration. Instead, for theoretical considerations and substantive research, we suggest that the dialogue and relationship between the phenomena of environmental change and migration can be approached through analyzing the complex role of transnational migrant networks in the context of cosmopolitanism. The empirical data presented in this paper point to the growing awareness of communal risks, such as environmental change, which is arguably encouraging a sense of shared future, thereby a collective responsibility in a transnational scale, not only among individuals but also among countries. We argue that this communality can be articulated as practices of cosmopolitanism surpassing ethnonationalist affiliations and the nation-state model.
We draw on Vertovec and Cohen (1999) who claim that migrants and other transnational communities tend to express complex affiliations, profound connections and various commitments to people, places, issues and practices which are situated beyond the frontiers of their resident nation-state. Specifically, cosmopolitanism can be invoked as a political project towards building transnational sites of democracy progressively described as an emerging global civil society and a political project for recognizing multiple subjects (pp.11-12).
Emerging Global Civil Society
This global civil society is to be seen in a rampant increase in the amount and extent of activities of transnational social movements and networks involved in various is-sues (ibid); environmental change being the case in this paper. Kaldor (1996) Cosmopolitanism from below is being invoked in the analysis as an understanding of expressing practices of individuals, regardless of ethnicity or citizenship, who openly engage in communal socio-political activities aimed at a sphere and scale crossing the boundaries of nation-states. As we see in this paper, transnational social movements and networks emerge through an agentic process initiated by empowered non-state actors and generate sentiments and goals.
According to Walzer (1995) , global civil society acts to create citizens who care about the common good, namely the political community. Morality binds this community and is rooted in shared communalities such as a common history, language, culture, or way of life. The affiliational soul of civil society is the existing ground where all accounts of the good are elaborated and established. Individuals willingly affiliate and communicate with each other, form groups of every kind, "not for the sake of any particular formation -family, tribe, nation, religion, commune, brotherhood or sisterhood, interest group or ideological movement -but for the sake of sociability itself. For we are by nature social, before we are political or economic beings" (p. 16).
Walzer claims that what is real is that the value of our political and economic activities and of our national culture is closely related to the life and potency of our affiliations. Social solidarity then is bounded by the communal cultural understandings of people. The value of the social goods for the individuals among whom they are to be shared out are culturally shaped (Walzer 1983 (Walzer , 1995 .
Multiple Subjects
This political project for recognizing multiple subjects can be traced to the ancient Greek Stoics and their claim that individuals are bound to their local affiliations or to 'a series of concentric circles' (Nussbaum 1994: 4) , wherein each circle signifies a different kind or level of affinity: from self, family, group, city, and country, to humanity in general (Vertovec and Cohen 2002) . Consequently, a person's particular political interests are bound to swing from one 'circle' to another. Contemporary processes, such as migrant identification and the upsurge of identity politics, have encouraged individuals to engage in multiple affiliations. For instance, gender, sexuality, age, disability, 'homeland', locality, race, ethnicity, religion and creolized or hybridized cultures are among the key associations today around which the same individual may at one time or another politically mobilize (ibid).
In this paper, we see how ordinary people draw on the resources, affiliations, opportunities of the societies they live in to politically mobilize in collective action around an environmental issue and act as a response to a humanitarian crisis. In the process, transnational activists gain new attitudes, try out new forms of action in response to feelings of empathy and emerge with new identities as empowered individuals through their contacts within and across borders. More importantly, the agents/individuals draw upon a collective bond, a 'we-feeling,' a specific belonging to a community, rooted in a particular situated relationship. As Rawls (1999a) puts it, having a duty to assist foreigners can be driven not "by self-interest but by mutual concern for each other's way of life and culture" (p. 113). 
